10 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |