Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Tarski's Theory of Truth' and 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
5831 The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
10825 The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
10820 In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
13499 Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
10818 Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
10817 Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
5829 We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
5830 The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10819 Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10827 Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
10826 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5826 The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]