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All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'The Mental Life of Some Machines' and 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
5831 The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
16539 A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
16540 Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
16548 An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
16549 Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
5829 We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
5830 The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16545 The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
16546 The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
16542 Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
16552 If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
16533 Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
16531 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
16532 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
16543 If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
16544 Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
16538 We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
16534 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5495 Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5826 The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16535 A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
16550 Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
16547 H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]