21 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |