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All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues' and 'The Language of Thought'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]