18 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |