22 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |