Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Essence and Modality' and 'The Concept of Mind'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]