11 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |