15 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| 16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
| 16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
| 16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |