52 ideas
6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |