17 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |