15 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |