17 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |