16 ideas
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| 10496 | Monothetic categories have fixed defining features, and polythetic categories do not [Ellen] |
| 10497 | In symbolic classification, the categories are linked to rules [Ellen] |
| 10495 | Continuous experience sometimes needs imposition of boundaries to create categories [Ellen] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 10498 | Classification is no longer held to be rooted in social institutions [Ellen] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |