17 ideas
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| 7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
| 10496 | Monothetic categories have fixed defining features, and polythetic categories do not [Ellen] |
| 10497 | In symbolic classification, the categories are linked to rules [Ellen] |
| 10495 | Continuous experience sometimes needs imposition of boundaries to create categories [Ellen] |
| 10498 | Classification is no longer held to be rooted in social institutions [Ellen] |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
| 20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
| 23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
| 23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
| 20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |