Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance' and 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


11 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]