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All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Higher-Order Logic' and 'Discourse on Metaphysics'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro]
If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro]
The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro]
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro]
Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]