27 ideas
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| 4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
| 4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
| 4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
| 4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
| 4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
| 4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
| 4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
| 4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
| 23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
| 23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
| 23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
| 23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
| 23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
| 23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
| 23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
| 23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
| 23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |