11 ideas
7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
23463 | Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |