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All the ideas for 'Thinking About Logic', 'The Universe as We Find It' and 'Dawn (Daybreak)'

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133 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche]
The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche]
Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche]
Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche]
Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche]
Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read]
Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read]
Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read]
Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read]
Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read]
Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / g. Von Neumann numbers
Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil]
In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil]
Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil]
A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil]
Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil]
The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche]
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil]
Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche]
Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche]
Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche]
The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche]
Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche]
The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche]
Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche]