133 ideas
20262 | Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche] |
18495 | The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil] |
20255 | Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche] |
20260 | Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche] |
20256 | What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche] |
18494 | Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil] |
18506 | Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil] |
20265 | The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche] |
18535 | Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil] |
20380 | Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche] |
20235 | Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche] |
18534 | Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil] |
18531 | Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil] |
18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
18518 | Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil] |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
18500 | How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil] |
18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
18505 | Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil] |
18499 | Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil] |
18512 | Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil] |
18508 | Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil] |
18532 | If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil] |
18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
18522 | Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil] |
18513 | Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil] |
18540 | Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil] |
18533 | In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil] |
18511 | Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil] |
18523 | Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil] |
18524 | Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil] |
18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
18507 | Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil] |
18515 | Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil] |
18516 | A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil] |
18514 | Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil] |
18517 | Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil] |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
18502 | If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
20258 | Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche] |
20250 | We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche] |
20270 | There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche] |
18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
20131 | We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche] |
20242 | Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche] |
20249 | Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche] |
20231 | People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche] |
18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
18536 | The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil] |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
20266 | It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche] |
20251 | Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche] |
20271 | Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche] |
20230 | The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche] |
20234 | Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche] |
20237 | Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche] |
20238 | Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche] |
18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
20243 | Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche] |
20268 | Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche] |
20236 | Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche] |
20263 | Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche] |
20252 | Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche] |
20233 | Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche] |
20248 | People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche] |
20246 | If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche] |
20272 | Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche] |
20240 | The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche] |
20244 | Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche] |
20274 | The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche] |
20257 | Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche] |
20259 | Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche] |
20267 | Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche] |
20275 | Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche] |
20229 | No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche] |
20254 | People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche] |
20273 | The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche] |
20232 | Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche] |
20253 | Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche] |
20261 | History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche] |
18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
18520 | Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil] |
18501 | Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil] |
20241 | Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche] |
20245 | Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche] |
20247 | Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche] |
20269 | 'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche] |
20264 | The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche] |