66 ideas
20981 | What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen] |
20982 | In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen] |
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
10190 | From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics is a storehouse of abstract structures [Bourbaki] |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
20990 | Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen] |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
21005 | A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen] |
20983 | The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen] |
20987 | The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen] |
20984 | A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen] |
20986 | A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen] |
21001 | Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen] |
21002 | Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen] |
20979 | Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen] |
20999 | Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen] |
20993 | Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen] |
20998 | Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen] |
20995 | Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen] |
20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
20988 | Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen] |
21000 | If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen] |
20980 | You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen] |
20978 | Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen] |
20985 | Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen] |
20994 | We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen] |