Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Common-Sense View of Reality', 'Investigations into Logical Deduction' and 'Properties'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Natural deduction shows the heart of reasoning (and sequent calculus is just a tool) [Gentzen, by Hacking]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]