Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Common-Sense View of Reality', 'Theological and other works' and 'Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic''

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley]