13 ideas
| 20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
| 12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
| 20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
| 20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
| 20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
| 20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
| 20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
| 8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
| 16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
| 12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
| 16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
| 9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
| 9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |