16 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |