14 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |