Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Common-Sense View of Reality', 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology' and 'A Problem about Substitutional Quantification?'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
20728 Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22153 Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
20726 We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
20727 Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
20730 If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
20729 Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
20731 The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
19485 Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
19486 We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]