42 ideas
4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |
2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |