Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Abstract Objects: a Case Study', 'Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols)' and 'The Nature of Mental States'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
7807 The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9618 Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
9830 Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10580 Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
10579 Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17265 Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
10577 Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
10578 We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9185 Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
22276 Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
17264 Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
12232 A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
12233 The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]