Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Abstract Objects: a Case Study', 'Criterion of Validity in Reasoning' and 'Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki]
There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]