Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Abstract Objects: a Case Study', 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?' and 'Thinking About Mechanisms'

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19 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10580 Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
10579 Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
10577 Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
10578 We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16473 Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
19258 Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]