42 ideas
| 5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
| 5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
| 3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
| 3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
| 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
| 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
| 5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
| 3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
| 5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
| 5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
| 5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
| 5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
| 5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
| 5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
| 5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
| 5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
| 5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
| 5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
| 5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
| 5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
| 3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
| 3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
| 3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
| 3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
| 5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
| 3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
| 5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
| 5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
| 3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
| 3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| 3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
| 3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
| 5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
| 5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
| 3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
| 5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
| 5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |