Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Abstract Objects: a Case Study', 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues' and 'Necessity and Non-Existence'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8877 We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
8884 The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10580 Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
10579 Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
10577 Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
10578 We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
8878 It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
8880 In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8881 Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8882 Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
8883 Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
8885 Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8876 Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8879 Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]