14 ideas
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| 9052 | Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith] |
| 16070 | There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
| 19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
| 19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
| 19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
| 19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
| 19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
| 19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
| 19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
| 19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
| 19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |