12 ideas
| 9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
| 9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
| 9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
| 9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
| 9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
| 9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
| 9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |