49 ideas
6887 | Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner] |
6881 | Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner] |
5439 | The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner] |
9959 | 'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner] |
9961 | 'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner] |
9958 | Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner] |
9960 | A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner] |
9957 | Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner] |
6219 | The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner] |
6888 | Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner] |
6877 | Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner] |
6880 | Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner] |
6879 | 'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner] |
6878 | A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner] |
6889 | Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
6890 | Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
5998 | From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ] |
20832 | The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus] |
14304 | Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus] |
6886 | Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner] |
6885 | Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner] |
6884 | Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner] |
6883 | Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner] |
6882 | Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner] |
5449 | Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner] |
6898 | Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner] |
6452 | 'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
4783 | Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG] |
4782 | 'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG] |
6899 | The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner] |
6024 | Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius] |
6896 | Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner] |
6897 | Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner] |
5452 | 'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner] |