72 ideas
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
20547 | We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift] |
20564 | Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift] |
20535 | Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift] |
20537 | Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift] |
20542 | Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift] |
20559 | Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift] |
20561 | Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift] |
20562 | Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift] |
20563 | Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift] |
20560 | Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift] |
20554 | Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift] |
20553 | Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift] |
20556 | The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift] |
20557 | Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift] |
20555 | Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift] |
20540 | Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift] |
20551 | Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift] |
20545 | Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift] |
20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
20536 | Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift] |
20548 | A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift] |
20541 | You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift] |
20546 | Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift] |
20533 | Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |