75 ideas
| 21761 | If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21764 | Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21769 | We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel] |
| 22037 | Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 21983 | Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel] |
| 21985 | The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel] |
| 21766 | Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21978 | Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
| 8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
| 8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
| 18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
| 8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
| 8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
| 8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
| 8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
| 8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
| 8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
| 8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
| 8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
| 8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
| 8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
| 8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
| 21762 | To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21977 | Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel] |
| 21760 | Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
| 21765 | The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22059 | Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 22083 | Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
| 22080 | The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel] |
| 6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
| 6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
| 6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
| 16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
| 21772 | In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel] |
| 6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
| 6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
| 6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
| 6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
| 21972 | Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 22038 | Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 22044 | Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel] |
| 21464 | The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner] |
| 22084 | Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel] |
| 21975 | The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel] |
| 21976 | The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 20954 | The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
| 6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
| 6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
| 6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
| 8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
| 6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
| 22058 | Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
| 6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
| 6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
| 6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
| 6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
| 10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
| 20953 | Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
| 21763 | When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
| 6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
| 15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
| 6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
| 6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
| 6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
| 6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |