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All the ideas for 'Thinking About Mathematics', 'Science and Method' and 'works'

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42 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn]
Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro]
A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge]
Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro]
Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro]
Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA]