107 ideas
13310 | Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca] |
13295 | Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca] |
13317 | Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca] |
13293 | What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca] |
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
13309 | That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
13313 | Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
13297 | To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
13307 | If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
21399 | Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca] |
13325 | Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca] |
22239 | Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen] |
13294 | We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca] |
13299 | Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca] |
13300 | It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca] |
13321 | Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca] |
13292 | Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca] |
13303 | A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca] |
13302 | Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca] |
13301 | We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca] |
13323 | The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca] |
13318 | Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca] |
13324 | Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca] |
13305 | Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca] |
13308 | It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca] |
13312 | Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca] |
13315 | To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca] |
13290 | One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca] |
13322 | Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca] |
13298 | Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca] |
13319 | If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca] |
13320 | Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
13311 | Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |