99 ideas
19023 | Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter] |
19033 | Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter] |
19032 | S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter] |
19036 | The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
19034 | The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter] |
19015 | Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter] |
19012 | The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter] |
19024 | A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter] |
19021 | I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter] |
19016 | We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter] |
19017 | Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter] |
19014 | How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter] |
19030 | Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter] |
19040 | We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter] |
19008 | The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter] |
19029 | It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter] |
19028 | Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter] |
19010 | All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter] |
19013 | Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter] |
23705 | A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
19009 | Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter] |
19027 | Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter] |
19019 | Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter] |
19031 | There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter] |
19025 | Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter] |
19022 | Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter] |
19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |
19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
19018 | Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter] |
19020 | Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter] |
19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke] |
19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke] |
19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke] |
19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke] |
19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke] |
19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke] |
19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke] |
19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke] |
5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton] |
19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke] |
6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke] |
19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke] |
19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke] |
19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke] |
19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke] |
19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke] |
19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke] |
19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke] |
19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke] |
19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke] |
19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke] |
19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke] |
19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke] |
19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke] |
19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke] |
19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke] |
19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke] |
19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke] |
19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |
19038 | Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter] |
19026 | If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter] |
19041 | Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter] |