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All the ideas for 'Thinking About Mathematics', 'Second Treatise of Government' and 'The Rediscovery of the Mind'

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126 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro]
A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro]
Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro]
Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle]
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle]
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is a function of expectation [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke]
All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke]
The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke]
There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton]
A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke]
If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke]
A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke]
You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke]
Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke]
Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke]
People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke]
Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke]
Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke]
If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke]
The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke]
Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke]
A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
All value depends on the labour involved [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke]
There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke]
A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke]
Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin]
Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke]
If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke]
A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke]
Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke]
Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke]
Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke]
Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke]
Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle]