118 ideas
| 12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
| 23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
| 12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
| 12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
| 12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
| 12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
| 12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
| 12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
| 12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
| 12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
| 12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons] |
| 12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
| 12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
| 12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
| 12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
| 12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
| 12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
| 18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
| 12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
| 12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
| 12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
| 12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
| 8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
| 12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
| 12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
| 8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
| 18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
| 8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
| 8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
| 8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
| 8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
| 8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
| 8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
| 8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
| 8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
| 8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
| 8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
| 8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
| 12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
| 12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
| 12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
| 12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
| 12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
| 12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
| 12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
| 12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
| 12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
| 12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
| 12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
| 12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
| 12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
| 12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
| 12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
| 12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
| 12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
| 12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
| 12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
| 12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
| 12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
| 12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
| 12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
| 12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
| 12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
| 12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
| 12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
| 12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
| 12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
| 12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
| 12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
| 12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
| 12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
| 12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
| 12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
| 12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
| 12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
| 12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
| 12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
| 12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
| 12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
| 12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
| 8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
| 24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
| 24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
| 23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
| 23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
| 23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
| 23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
| 23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
| 23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
| 23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
| 23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
| 23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
| 23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
| 23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
| 23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
| 23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
| 24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
| 23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
| 23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
| 23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
| 23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
| 23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
| 23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
| 23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
| 23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
| 23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
| 23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
| 23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
| 12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
| 23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
| 24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
| 12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |
| 24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
| 24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
| 24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
| 23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |