21 ideas
9540 | A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell] |
9541 | The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell] |
9543 | The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
9544 | A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
16285 | A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
19155 | Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions [Jeffrey, by Davidson] |