57 ideas
21761 | If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21764 | Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21769 | We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel] |
22037 | Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
21983 | Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel] |
21985 | The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel] |
21766 | Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21978 | Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
21762 | To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21977 | Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel] |
21760 | Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21765 | The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
4986 | A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R] |
22059 | Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie] |
22083 | Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
22080 | The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel] |
21772 | In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel] |
21972 | Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
22038 | Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
22044 | Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel] |
21464 | The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner] |
21975 | The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel] |
21976 | The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
22084 | Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel] |
20954 | The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
22058 | Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie] |
5001 | Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R] |
4993 | If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R] |
5000 | Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R] |
4982 | Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R] |
4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
4990 | The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R] |
4984 | All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R] |
4998 | Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R] |
4985 | If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R] |
20953 | Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie] |
4997 | It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R] |
4999 | For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R] |
4995 | Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R] |
21763 | When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate] |