17 ideas
19743 | A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers] |
17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
6176 | A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands] |
19741 | If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers] |
19742 | Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers] |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
19744 | If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers] |
17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |