Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mechanisms', 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions' and 'Thinking About Mechanisms'

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25 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]