Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mechanisms', 'The Fixation of Belief' and 'The Emergence of Probability'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]