17 ideas
| 19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
| 19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
| 19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |
| 19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |
| 17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
| 17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
| 17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
| 17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
| 17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
| 17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| 17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |